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Abstract: For privacy concerns to be addressed adequately in today’s machine learning systems, 
the knowledge gap between the machine learning and privacy communities must be bridged. 
This article aims to provide an introduction to the intersection of both fields with special 
emphasis on the techniques used to protect the data. 
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Introduction 
Our search queries, browsing history, purchase transactions, the videos we watch, and our 
movies' preferences are but few types of information that are being collected and stored on daily 
basis. This data collection happens within our mobile devices and computers, on the streets, and 
even in our own offices and homes. Such private data is being used for a variety of machine 
learning applications. 
Machine learning (ML) is being increasingly utilized for a variety of applications from intrusion 
detection to recommending new movies. Some ML applications require private individuals’ data. 
Such private data is uploaded to centralized locations in clear text for ML algorithms to extract 
patterns, and build models from them. The problem is not limited to the threats associated with 
having all this private data exposed to insider threat at these companies, or outsider threat if the 
companies holding these data sets were hacked. In addition, it is possible to glean extra 
information about the private data sets even if the data was anonymized1, or the data itself and 
the ML models were inaccessible and only the testing results were revealed2. 
In this article, we will describe machine learning tasks and applications, and the potential threats 
associated with current methods of collecting data or building ML systems. We will further 
elaborate on the techniques proposed to protect the privacy of individuals or corporates. Our 
intention is to bridge the gap between machine learning and privacy and security technologies 
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by helping professionals of either fields to be more acquainted with machine learning, the 
potential threats to privacy, the proposed solutions, and the challenges that lie ahead.  
 
Machine Learning 
Arthur Samuel, a pioneer in the fields of computer gaming and artificial intelligence, described 
machine learning as “a field of study that gives computers the ability to learn without being 
explicitly programmed”. The aim of machine learning algorithms is to learn how to perform 
certain tasks by generalizing from data. Such tasks might include giving accurate predictions or 
finding structures in data.  
The input data to a ML algorithm is usually represented as a set of samples. Each sample would 
contain a set of feature values. For example, consider a 100x100 pixels photo, where each pixel 
is represented by a single number (0-255 grayscale). We can use these pixel values to form a 
vector of length 10,000, which is normally called a feature vector. Each photo, represented as a 
feature vector, can be associated with a label (e.g., name of the person in the photo). An ML 
algorithm would use a training set formed of multiple feature vectors, and their associated labels, 
to build an ML model. This process is called the training or learning phase. When presented with 
a new test sample, this ML model should give the predicted label (person’s name or identifier in 
face recognition applications). The ability of such an ML model to accurately predict the label is 
a measure of how well this ML model generalizes to unseen data. It is measured empirically by 
the test error (generalization error), and it can depend on the quality and quantity of the data 
used for training the model, what ML algorithm was used to build the model, the selection of ML 
algorithm hyper parameters (e.g., using cross validation), and even the features’ extraction 
method (if any was required).  
In general, some feature extraction method might be needed to produce useful features from 
the raw data, such as the preprocessing step for pictures (as raw data) which might involve face 
detection, followed by cropping and resizing to 100x100 pixels to match the feature vector 
length3, or projecting the data to lower dimensions using PCA4. Feature engineering utilizes 
domain knowledge to produce features from raw data, and it is important for many applications, 
however, in many modern applications it has been reduced to mere preprocessing steps. Data 
sets are generally formed of feature vectors, regardless of whether this data is labeled or not, 
which depends on the application or learning style. 
In general, we can categorize ML algorithms based on their learning style into supervised or 
unsupervised learning (or a combination of both): 
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Supervised Learning: that utilizes labeled data where each feature vector is associated with an 
output value that might be a class label (classification), or a continuous value (regression). This 
labeled data is used to build models (training phase) that can predict the label of new feature 
vectors (testing phase).  
 
Figure 1: Machine Learning Tasks Overview. (a) Classification: finding a separating dashed line 
between the two classes, “circles” and “triangles” classes, (b) Regression: fitting a predictive 
model (dashed line to the observed data points, (c) Clustering: grouping a set of samples into a 
number of clusters. 
 
With classification, the samples (feature vectors) belong to two or more classes, and the 
objective of the ML algorithm is to determine the class to which the new sample belongs. Some 
algorithm might achieve that by finding a separating hyperplane between the different classes as 
can be seen in fig. 1a. An example application is face recognition where a face image can be 
tested to ascertain that it belongs to a certain person. Multiple classification algorithms can be 
used for each of the above applications such as Support Vector Machines (SVM), Neural Networks 
or Logistic Regression.  
When the label of a sample is a continuous value (also called the dependent or response variable) 
rather than a discrete one, the task is called regression. The samples are formed of features that 
are also called independent variables. The target of regression would be fitting a predictive model 
(such as a line) to an observed data set such that the distances between the observed data points 
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and this line are minimized (fig. 2b).  A simple example would be estimating the price of a house 
based on its location, area, and number of rooms.  
Unsupervised Learning: With this type of learning, data is not labeled as feature vectors do not 
come with a class label or a response variable. The target in this case would be to find structure 
in the data. Clustering is probably the most common unsupervised learning technique, and its 
aim is to group a set of samples into different clusters (fig. 2c). Samples in the same cluster are 
supposed to be relatively similar to each other, and different from samples in other clusters (the 
similarity measure could be the Euclidean distance). K-means is one of the most popular 
clustering methods.  
Semi-supervised Learning: Labeling the data can be expensive as it requires human experts or 
special devices; hence, only some of data gets labeled sometimes, while the vast majority 
remains unlabeled. Researchers found that even having a small portion of labeled data can 
considerably improve the learning process.  
Other Applications: Some ML tasks and applications do not strictly fall into one of the categories 
above as they can be performed either in a supervised or unsupervised way. Examples include 
dimensionality reduction and recommender systems. 
 
Threats 
In each of the ML tasks mentioned above, three different roles are possible: the input party (data 
owners or contributors), the computation party and the results’ party5. In such systems, the data 
owner(s) send their data to the computation party that performs the required ML task and 
delivers the output to the results’ party. Such output could be an ML model that the results’ party 
can utilize for testing new samples. In other cases, the computation party might keep the ML 
model, and performs the task of testing new samples submitted by the results’ party, and 
returning the testing results to the results’ party. If all three roles are assumed by the same entity, 
then privacy is naturally preserved; however, when these roles are distributed across two or 
more entities, then privacy enhancing technologies are needed. 
It is common to have the same entity be both the computation and the results’ parties, and this 
entity is mostly separate from the data owners. In fact, with all of the data that is collected from 
individuals around the world on daily basis, data owners might not be aware of how the data 
collected from them is being used (or misused), and in many cases, not even aware that some 
data types are being collected.  
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There are multiple levels of threats depending on the privacy leaks associated with the data 
sharing process as can be seen from Fig. 2, and the following paragraphs: 
Private Data in the Clear: If the data owner(s) are separate from the computation party, then 
the private data would be transferred to the computation party, possibly over a secure channel. 
However, it would most likely reside in the computation server(s) in its original form, i.e. not 
encrypted or transformed in any way. This is the biggest type of threat as the private data would 
be susceptible to both insider and outsider attacks. Such private data could be stored as raw data, 
or as features extracted from the raw data. Naturally, storing it in a raw form imposes greater 
threat as the data is ready to be processed in any way possible.  
 
 
Figure 2: Machine Learning and threats 
 
Reconstruction Attacks: Even when only the features (extracted from the raw data) are 
transferred to, and stored in the computation party server(s), there is a threat imposed by 
reconstruction attacks. In this case, the adversary’s goal is reconstructing the raw private data 
by using their knowledge of the feature vectors. Reconstruction attacks require white-box access 
to the ML model, i.e. the feature vectors in a model must be known. Such attacks could be 
possible when the feature vectors used for the ML training phase were not deleted after building 
the desired ML model. In fact, some ML algorithms such as SVM or kNN store feature vectors in 
the model itself. Examples of successful cases of reconstruction attacks include: fingerprint 
reconstruction6 where a fingerprint image (raw data) could be reconstructed from a minutiae 
template (features), and mobile device touch gesture reconstruction7 where touch events (raw 
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data) were reconstructed from gesture features such as velocity and direction. In both cases, a 
privacy threat (caused by not protecting the private data in its feature form) resulted in a security 
threat to authentication systems that in turn results in failure to protect the data owners’ privacy 
(since attackers might gain access to the data owners’ devices). While the aim of these cases was 
misguiding a ML system into thinking the reconstructed raw data belonged to a certain data 
owner, other reconstruction attacks might reveal private data directly such as location or age. 
To resist reconstruction attacks, ML models that store explicit feature vectors (e.g. SVM) should 
be avoided, or, if used, they should not be provided to the results’ party. Moreover, protection 
against model inversion attacks should be in place to prevent synthesizing feature vectors.   
Model Inversion Attacks: Some ML algorithms produce models where explicit feature vectors 
are not stored in the ML model, e.g. ridge regression or neural networks. Hence, the adversary’s 
knowledge would be limited to either: (a) an ML model with no stored feature vectors (white-
box access), or (b) only the responses returned by the computation party when the results’ party 
submits new testing samples (black-box access). Here, the adversary’s target is creating feature 
vectors that resemble those used to create an ML model by utilizing the responses received from 
that ML model. Such attacks utilize the confidence information (e.g. probability or SVM decision 
value) that are sent back as a response for testing samples submitted by the results’ party. These 
attacks produce an average that represents a certain class; hence, they would be most 
threatening to privacy when a certain class represents a single individual, as in face recognition. 
It should be noted that Fredrikson et al.2 demonstration of their model inversion attack also 
included reconstruction in the same step. This was because the features in their case matched 
the raw data (face images).  
To resist such attacks, the results’ party should be limited to black-box access, and the output 
should be limited; thereby decreasing the black-box adversary’s knowledge. For example, the 
attack success rate decreased when classification algorithms reported rounded confidence 
values2 or just the predicted class labels7. A step further could be aggregating the result of testing 
multiple samples7, but this approach would not be appropriate for all applications. 
Membership Inference Attacks: While model inversion attacks do not produce an actual sample 
from the training set, nor do they infer whether a sample was in the training set based on the ML 
model output, membership inference attacks do the latter. Given an ML model and a sample 
(adversary’s knowledge), membership inference attacks aim to determine if the sample was a 
member of the training set used to build this ML model (adversary’s target). This attack could be 
used by an adversary to learn whether a certain individual’s record was used to train an ML model 
associated with a specific disease. Such attacks utilize the differences in the ML model predictions 
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on samples that were used in the training set versus those that were not included. Shokri et al.8 
investigated these attacks, and trained attack models that take a sample’s correct label and the 
target ML model prediction as inputs, and determines whether the sample was in the training set 
or not. These attack models were trained using shadow models built from data generated using 
three methods: model inversion attack, statistics-based synthesis, or noisy real data. While 
training the attack models utilized a black or white-box access, performing the attacks using these 
models only required a black-box adversary.  
Shokri et al.8 tried different mitigation techniques such as regularization and coarse precision of 
prediction vectors, and found that limiting the output to the class label was the most effective, 
albeit not enough to thwart the attack completely. By definition, differential privacy can resist 
membership inference attacks (as will be seen in the next section).   
De-anonymization (Re-Identification): Anonymization by removing personal identifiers before 
releasing the data to the public may seem like a natural approach for protecting the privacy of 
individuals. Indeed, some companies attempted to protect their users’ privacy by only releasing 
anonymized versions of their datasets, as was the case with the anonymous movie ratings 
released by Netflix to aid contestants for its 1M$ prize to build better recommender systems (for 
movies). Despite the anonymization, researchers were able to utilize this dataset along with 
IMDB background knowledge to identify the Netflix records of known users, and were further 
able to deduce the users’ apparent political preferences1. This incident demonstrates that 
anonymization cannot reliably protect the privacy of individuals in the face of strong adversaries.  
 
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning (PPML) 
Many privacy-enhancing techniques concentrated on allowing multiple input parties to 
collaboratively train ML models without releasing their private data in its original form. This was 
mainly performed by utilizing cryptographic approaches, or differentially-private data release 
(perturbation techniques). Differential privacy is especially effective in preventing membership 
inference attacks. Finally, as discussed above, the success of model inversion and membership 
inference attacks can be decreased by limiting the model prediction output (e.g. class labels only).  
 
Cryptographic Approaches 
When a certain ML application requires data from multiple input parties, cryptographic protocols 
could be utilized to perform ML training/testing on encrypted data. In many of these techniques, 
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achieving better efficiency involved having data owners contribute their encrypted data to the 
computation servers, which would reduce the problem to a secure two/three party computation 
setting. In addition to increased efficiency, such approaches have the benefit of not requiring the 
input parties to remain online.  
Most of these approaches address the case of horizontally-partitioned data: Each data owner has 
collected the same set of features for different data objects. Face recognition is one example 
since each person that wants an ML model trained for her face can submit multiple feature 
vectors extracted from their own photos. In each of these cases, the same set of features is 
extracted by each data owner. 
Homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, secret sharing and secure processors are the most 
widely used cryptographic techniques to achieve PPML: 
Homomorphic Encryption: Fully homomorphic encryption enables the computation on 
encrypted data, with operations such as addition and multiplication that can be used as basis for 
more complex arbitrary functions. Due to the high cost associated with frequently bootstrapping 
the cipher text (refreshing the cipher text because of the accumulated noise), additive 
homomorphic encryption schemes were mostly used in PPML approaches. Such schemes only 
enable addition operations on encrypted data, and multiplication by a plaintext. A popular 
example is Paillier cryptosystem.  
To extend additive homomorphic encryption functionality, protocols were developed to enable 
comparison of two encrypted values, or to perform secure multiplication and decryption 
operations, mostly by “blinding” the cipher text through adding an encrypted random value to 
the encrypted value that needs to be protected. To increase the efficiency of using additive 
homomorphic encryption, data packing techniques were developed to enable more than one 
plain text value to be encrypted by the same cipher text. Such techniques were employed by 
some PPML approaches to enable efficient and secure PPML systems such as the collaborative 
filtering system9 proposed by Erkin et al. which used all of the previous techniques. In this system, 
data owners contribute data encrypted with the public key of a privacy service provider (PSP), 
but send the encrypted data to the service provider (SP). The PSP provides privacy and 
computation services, while the SP provides storage and computation services with the intention 
of generating private recommendations for its customers (the data owners). For such system to 
be secure, the SP and the PSP must not collude. Since they provide different services, it is 
understandable that the SP and the PSP could be different companies; hence, the non-collusion 
assumption is plausible. In this system, the data owners are both input and results’ parties while 
the SP and PSP are the computation parties.  
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Garbled Circuits: Assuming a two-party setup with Alice and Bob wanting to obtain the result of 
a function computed on their private inputs, Alice can convert the function into a garbled circuit, 
and send this circuit along with her garbled input. Bob obtains the garbled version of his input 
from Alice without her learning anything about Bob’s private input (e.g., using oblivious transfer). 
Bob can now use his garbled input with the garbled circuit to obtain the result of the required 
function (and can optionally share it with Alice). Some PPML approaches combined additive 
homomorphic encryption with Garbled circuits. Nikolaenko et al.10 developed a PP ridge 
regression system that utilized both techniques, where an evaluator, similar to the SP in Erkin et 
al.9, adds the encrypted shares submitted by multiple data owners to obtain encrypted 
intermediate values. These shares are encrypted using additive homomorphic encryption with 
the public key of the crypto service provider CSP (similar to the PSP in Erkin et al.9). The CSP then 
creates a garbled circuit and sends it to the evaluator that also obtains the garbled version of the 
intermediate shares from the CSP. The evaluator can proceed with using the garbled circuit and 
its garbled input to create the ML model(s) it needs.  
Some PPML approaches concentrated on the classification task alone (testing phase rather than 
training/testing phases). Bost et al.13 developed cryptographic building blocks using 
homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits that enabled them to construct three popular 
classification protocols: hyperplane decision, Naïve Bayes, and decision trees. The aim was to 
enable testing new samples while protecting both the ML model and the submitted samples. 
Secret Sharing is a method for distributing a secret among multiple parties, with each one holding 
a “share” of the secret. Individual shares are of no use on their own; however, when the shares 
are combined, the secret can be reconstructed. With threshold secret sharing, not all the 
“shares” are required to reconstruct the secret; but only “t” of them (“t” refers to threshold).  
In one setting, multiple input parties can generate “shares” of their private data, and send these 
shares to a set of non-colluding computation servers. Each server could compute a “partial result” 
from the “shares” it received. Finally, a results’ party (or a proxy) can receive these partial results, 
and combine them to find the final result. Since these computation servers have similar 
functionalities (unlike SP and PSP mentioned above), special attention should be paid to where 
such servers are hosted, and which entities control them, in order to convince data owners that 
the computation servers would not collude. In general, secret sharing approaches might be more 
efficient than the other cryptographic approaches, and this resulted in having multiple 
commercial products that utilize secret sharing. An example is ShareMind developed by 
Cybernetica which was used to develop a privacy-preserving system for performing PCA 
computation by adapting parallelized PCA computation method to the secret sharing paradigm11.   
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In another settings12, the “shares” are distributed among other input parties (users), rather than 
with the computation party (server). Bonawitz et al.12 developed a protocol for securely 
computing sums of vectors, to aggregate user-provided model updates for training a neural 
network model. Each user applies double-masking (blinding) on its private update vector using: 
a user-specific secret value, and secret values shared with other users (generated using Diffie-
Hellman key agreement). To account for users dropping out before finishing the protocol, each 
user distributes “shares” of its user-specific secret and its Diffie-Hellman private key to other 
users. The server is tasked with routing messages between the users, and computing the final 
result if at least “t” of the users survive until the last round (threshold secret sharing). This 
protocol is communication-efficient (no more than twice the plain text counterpart); which 
makes it suitable for high-dimensional vectors.  
Secure Processors: While initially introduced to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of 
sensitive code from unauthorized access by rogue software at higher privilege levels, Intel SGX-
processor are being utilized in privacy-preserving computation. Ohrimenko et al.14 developed a 
data oblivious ML algorithms for neural networks, SVM, k-means clustering, decision trees and 
matrix factorization that are based on SGX-processors. The main idea involves having multiple 
data owners collaborate to perform one of the above mentioned ML tasks with the computation 
party running the ML task on an SGX-enabled data center. An adversary can control all the 
hardware and software in the data center except for the SGX-processors used for computation. 
In this system, each data owner independently establishes a secure channel with the enclave 
(containing the code and data), authenticates themselves, verifies the integrity of the ML code in 
the cloud, and securely uploads its private data to the enclave. After all the data is uploaded, the 
ML task is run by the secure processor, and the output is sent to the results’ parties over secure 
authenticated channels.  
 
Perturbation Approaches 
Differential privacy (DP) techniques resist membership inference attacks by adding random noise 
to the input data, to iterations in a certain algorithm, or to the algorithm output. While most DP 
approaches assume a trusted aggregator of the data, local differential privacy allows each input 
party to add the noise locally; thus, requiring no trusted server. Finally, dimensionally reduction 
perturbs the data by projecting it to a lower dimensional hyperplane to prevent reconstructing 
the original data, and/or to restrict inference of sensitive information. 
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Differential Privacy (DP): A randomized algorithm M is 𝜀-differentially private if for all S in the 
range of M, and for all data sets D and D’ differing in one record: 
Pr[𝑀(𝐷) ∈ 𝑆] ≤ exp(𝜀) Pr[𝑀(𝐷ᇱ) ∈ 𝑆] 
Hence, DP ensures that any sequence of outputs (response to queries) is essentially equally likely 
to happen, whether a certain record was included in the data set or not15 (“essentially” is 
captured by the parameter 𝜀). In recent practical publications4 16, the parameter 𝜀 was set to be 
a single digit (smaller values indicate better privacy).  
Composition is an important property of DP which enables the design and analysis of complex DP 
algorithms from simpler DP building blocks. The composition of a sequence of k mechanisms, 
where the ith mechanism provides 𝜀௜-DP, is (∑ 𝜀௜௞௜ୀଵ )-DP (refer to Dwork and Roth15 for proofs 
and more advanced composition theorems). It is not unnatural that the strength of the privacy 
guarantee would degrade with repeated use of the mechanism, but DP provides a way to quantify 
the privacy loss.  
Adding 𝛿 to the right-hand-side of the above equation yields (𝜀, 𝛿)-differential privacy (a 
relaxation with weaker privacy guarantees than pure differential privacy, i.e. 𝜀-DP). The (𝜀, 𝛿)-
DP definition was proposed to capture the privacy guarantees of the Gaussian mechanism, and 
due to the applications of advanced composition theorems. To avoid compromising the privacy, 
the value of 𝛿 has to be less than the inverse of any polynomial in the size of the database15. 
Recently, alternative relaxations of 𝜀-DP were proposed, e.g. Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP)17. 
While accommodating the analysis of the Gaussian mechanism and advanced composition 
theorems, RDP could be preferred over (𝜀, 𝛿)-DP since RDP does not allow a total breach of 
privacy with no residual uncertainty17.  
By definition, differential privacy (DP) can deter membership inference attacks. DP is also utilized 
by some distributed learning approaches to enable protection of the original data in case of 
multiple input parties. In addition, DP is immune to post-processing; meaning that even in the 
presence of auxiliary information, an adversary cannot increase the privacy loss. Thus, DP 
neutralizes linkage attacks used for de-anonymization.  
From the definition above, it’s clear that DP algorithms are randomized. They can be categorized 
according to where, and how, the randomness is applied: 
1. Input Perturbation: In this case, noise is added to the data itself, and after the desired 
non-private-computation is performed on the noisy input, the output would be 
differentially-private. Taking PCA as an example where Eigen-decomposition is performed 
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on the covariance matrix, Dwork et al.18 adds symmetric Gaussian noise matrix to the 
covariance matrix before performing Eigen-decomposition. The output would be a DP-
projection matrix (the target here is not releasing the projected data, but the DP-
projection matrix). 
2. Algorithm Perturbation: Another approach is perturbing intermediate values in iterative 
algorithms. For example, Eigen-decomposition for PCA can be performed using the power 
method, which is an iterative algorithm. Hardt and Price19 proposed adding Gaussian 
noise in each iteration of the algorithm which operates on the non-perturbed covariance 
matrix, leading to DP-PCA. Similarly, Abadi et al.4 proposed a DP-Deep learning system by 
modifying the stochastic gradient descent algorithm to have Gaussian noise added in each 
of its iterations.  
3. Output Perturbation involves running the non-private-learning algorithm, and then 
adding noise to the generated model. For cases where adding noise to the computed 
output would destroy its value, the Exponential mechanism could be used. Given some 
utility function u(D,r) that tells us how good an output r is on database D, the exponential 
mechanism selects an output r with probability proportional to this utility function (i.e., 
the output would be biased towards ones with higher quality). This method was used for 
achieving DP-PCA by sampling a random k-dimensional subspace that approximates the 
top-k PCA subspace20.  
4. Finally, objective perturbation entails adding noise to the objective function for learning 
algorithms such as Empirical Risk Minimization21. 
The approaches mentioned above work on data hosted by a single server (a trusted server). To 
enable training on disjoint datasets held by multiple input parties, Papernot et al.16 proposed to 
first learn an ensemble of teacher models from the disjoint datasets, use these teachers to make 
noisy predictions on public data, which can be used in turn to build a student model. The privacy 
loss is determined by the number of queries made to the teachers during the student training, 
and do not increase as end-users query the deployed student model16. This approach is not 
limited to a single ML algorithm, but it requires adequate data quantity at each location.  
Local Differential Privacy: When the input parties do not have enough information to train a ML 
model, it might be better to utilize approaches that rely on local differential privacy (LDP). With 
LDP, each input party would perturb their data, and only release this obscure view of the data. 
An old, and well-known version of local privacy is randomized response (Warner 1965), which 
provided plausible deniability for respondents to sensitive queries. For example, a respondent 
would flip a fair coin: (a) if “tails”, the respondent answers truthfully, and (b) if “heads”, then flip 
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a second coin, and respond “Yes” if heads, and “No” if tails. This version of randomized response 
(RR) is (ln 3)-differentially private15.  
RAPPOR 22 is a technology for crowdsourcing statistics from end-user client software by applying 
RR to Bloom filters with strong 𝜀-DP guarantees. RAPPOR is deployed in Google Chrome web 
browser, and it permits collecting statistics on client-side values and strings, such as their 
categories, frequencies, and histograms. By performing RR twice with a memoization step in 
between, privacy protection is maintained even when multiple responses are collected from the 
same participant over time 22. 
A ML oriented work, AnonML23, utilized the ideas of RR for generating histograms from multiple 
input parties. AnonML utilizes these histograms to generate synthetic data on which a ML model 
can be trained. Like other local DP approaches, AnonML is a good option when no input party has 
enough data to build a ML model on their own (and there is no trusted aggregator).  
Dimensionality Reduction (DR) perturbs the data by projecting it to a lower dimensional 
hyperplane. Such transformation is lossy, and it was suggested by Liu et al.24 that it would 
enhance the privacy, since retrieving the exact original data from a reduced dimension version 
would not be possible (the possible solutions are infinite as the number of equations is less than 
the number of unknowns). Hence, Liu et al.24 proposed to use a random matrix to reduce the 
dimensions of the input data. Since a random matrix might decrease the utility, other approaches 
used both unsupervised and supervised DR techniques such as principal component analysis 
(PCA), discriminant component analysis (DCA), and multidimensional scaling (MDS). These 
approaches try to find the best projection matrix for utility purposes, while relying on the reduced 
dimensionality aspect to enhance the privacy.  
Since an approximation of the original data can still be obtained from the reduced dimensions, 
some approaches, e.g. Jiang et al.25, combined dimensionality reduction with DP to achieve  
differentially-private data publishing. While some entities might seek total hiding of their data, 
DR has another benefit for privacy. For datasets that have samples with two labels: a utility label 
and a privacy label, Kung26 proposes a DR method to enable the data owner to project her data 
in a way that enables maximizing the accuracy of learning for the utility labels, while decreasing 
the accuracy for learning the privacy labels. Although this method does not eliminate all privacy 
risks of the data, it enables controlling the misuse of the data when the privacy target is known. 
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Challenges and outlook 
Despite the aforementioned techniques to protect the private data while performing ML training 
and/or testing, non-privacy-aware ML algorithms are still being widely used, and private data is 
still being uploaded to the cloud on daily basis. Current laws might force companies to declare 
that they are collecting data, and might even give the user the option to opt out of such data 
collection, but it seems like a zero or one decision. There should be an alternative option that 
utilizes some of privacy-preserving ML techniques already proposed by the research community, 
however, some issues might hinder achieving that.  
The first issue is flexibility. Many of the aforementioned PPML techniques are tied to a certain 
ML algorithm. This would pose a problem especially considering the fact that new ideas and 
advances in ML are being proposed on regular basis. Thus, some of these PPML techniques might 
need to be re-purposed regularly to cope up with the new advances. In such cases, transformed 
data release, the distributed approach by Papernot et al.16, or local differential privacy might be 
favorable as they provide the opportunity to apply new advances in ML without extensive 
customization.  
Another issue is scalability, both in terms of processing and communication costs. A similar 
problem happens with algorithms design where higher processing powers was accompanied by 
greater amounts of data; hence, new techniques were required. New advances in ML 
concentrated on efficiency, parallelism and reducing the communication cost. However, many 
PPML techniques impose additional processing and communication costs that might limit the 
ability to utilize the huge amounts of data available today. Promising PPML techniques could be 
those that are already built around distributed processing, and only exchanging summary 
statistics or model parameters.  
In addition, security assumptions for some PPML systems need to be addressed properly. An 
example is non-collusion assumptions where two or more of the computation parties might be 
assumed not to collude. Such assumptions might be easier to justify when the different parties 
perform different roles; thus implying they could be different companies (such as the service 
provider and the PSP in Erkin et al.9). the question remains: who will take the role of the privacy 
service provider? And how will they make their profit to sustain their business? 
Policies are yet another issue. Privacy policies can help the data owners specify which data is 
being shared, according to what rules or privacy guarantees, who will use the data, and for what 
purpose? It is important to determine if the policy will be enforced at the client side, meaning 
that it would be transformed to a form that limits all other uses, or at least eliminates some uses 
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with known privacy threats. Another option would be sending the policy with the data to the 
computation servers where the servers have to be trusted to honor the policy rules. If the 
computation party and the results’ party are controlled by the same entity, trust would be an 
issue.  
To summarize and present other issues, we can take the human data interaction (HDI) principles 
into consideration. While HDI applies to any type of data sharing, we concentrate here on the 
specific case of Machine Learning. Mortier et al. identify three core themes of HDI27: Legibility, 
Agency and Negotiability. Legibility means informing data owners that their data is being 
collected, what data is being collected, how it is being used (including what inferences might be 
made), and potentially providing legible explanation of how their privacy is being preserved. 
While some companies, e.g. Google and Apple, started using local differential privacy for data 
collection, it might still be a challenge to explain the technology to the public, and the 
implications of their choice of specific 𝜀 on the users’ privacy. 
Agency is concerned with enabling data owners to have control of their data in ML systems. 
Enabling data owners to opt out of data collection, or set rules and policies about how their data 
is being used, and even adjust some incorrect inferences that were made about them. One 
example would be machine unlearning28 where the target was adjusting an ML model, that was 
built using wrong data about a data owner, and enable incremental unlearning without having to 
start the training process from scratch. Such techniques could be beneficial to help realize “the 
right to be forgotten” that was recently enforced by the European Union.  
Since the definition of privacy (and associated threats) might evolve overtime, Negotiability in 
PPML systems is essential. Negotiability enables the data owners to re-evaluate their data sharing 
decisions (e.g. enabling them to withdraw from ML systems completely or partially, or to simply 
change the policies of using their data). As we design current systems, how can we make the 
policy definitions extensible to enable addressing unforeseen concerns in policies that were 
created to address today’s concerns?  
 
Acknowledgment 
This material is based on research sponsored by the DARPA Brandeis Program under agreement 
number N66001-15-C-4068. The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this article are 
those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies, 
either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the 
Department of Defense. 
© 2018 IEEE 
 
16 
 
References 
1  Narayanan, Arvind and Shmatikov, Vitaly (2008) ‘Robust de-anonymization of large 
sparse datasets’. Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 111–125. 
2  Fredrikson, Matt, Ristenpart, Thomas, Tech, Cornell, Jha, Somesh and Ristenpart, Thomas 
(2015) ‘Model Inversion Attacks that Exploit Confidence Information and Basic 
Countermeasures’. Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security - CCS ’15, pp. 1322–1333. 
3  Bishop, Christopher M. (2007) ‘Pattern Recognition And Machine Learning’. Book, p. 738. 
4  Abadi, Martin, Chu, Andy, Goodfellow, Ian, McMahan, H. Brendan, et al. (2016) ‘Deep 
Learning with Differential Privacy’. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security - CCS’16, (Ccs), pp. 308–318. 
5  Bogdanov, Dan, Kamm, Liina, Laur, Sven, Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, Pille, et al. (2014) 
‘Privacy-Preserving Statistical Data Analysis on Federated Databases’. Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture 
Notes in Bioinformatics), 8450 LNCS, pp. 30–55. 
6  Jianjiang Feng and Jain, A K (2011) ‘Fingerprint Reconstruction: From Minutiae to Phase’. 
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 33(2), pp. 209–223. 
7  Al-Rubaie, Mohammad and Chang, J. Morris (2016) ‘Reconstruction Attacks Against 
Mobile-Based Continuous Authentication Systems in the Cloud’. IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security, 11(12), pp. 2648–2663. 
8  Shokri, Reza, Stronati, Marco, Song, Congzheng and Shmatikov, Vitaly (2017) 
‘Membership Inference Attacks Against Machine Learning Models’, in 2017 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), IEEE, pp. 3–18. 
9  Erkin, Zekeriya, Veugen, Thijs, Toft, Tomas and Lagendijk, Reginald L. (2012) ‘Generating 
private recommendations efficiently using homomorphic encryption and data packing’. 
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 7(3), pp. 1053–1066. 
10  Nikolaenko, Valeria, Weinsberg, Udi, Ioannidis, Stratis, Joye, Marc, et al. (2013) ‘Privacy-
preserving ridge regression on hundreds of millions of records’. Proceedings - IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 334–348. 
11  Bogdanov, Dan, Kamm, Liina, Laur, Sven and Sokk, Ville (n.d.) ‘Implementation and 
Evaluation of an Algorithm for Cryptographically Private Principal Component Analysis on 
Genomic Data – Short Paper’. 
© 2018 IEEE 
 
17 
 
12  Bonawitz, Keith, Ivanov, Vladimir, Kreuter, Ben, Marcedone, Antonio, et al. (2017) 
‘Practical Secure Aggregation for Privacy Preserving Machine Learning’. Cryptology ePrint 
Archive: Report 2017/281. 
13  Bost, Raphaël, Popa, Ra, Tu, Stephen and Goldwasser, S (2014) ‘Machine Learning 
Classification over Encrypted Data’. Eprint.Iacr.Org, (February), pp. 1–31. 
14  Ohrimenko, Olga, Schuster, Felix, Fournet, Cedric, Mehta, Aastha, et al. (2016) ‘Oblivious 
Multi-Party Machine Learning on Trusted Processors’. 25th USENIX Security Symposium 
(USENIX Security 16), pp. 619–636. 
15  Dwork, Cynthia and Roth, Aaron (2014) ‘The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential 
Privacy’. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 9(2013), pp. 211–407. 
16  Papernot, Nicolas, Abadi, Mart’\in, Erlingsson, Úlfar, Goodfellow, Ian and Talwar, Kunal 
(2016) ‘Semi-supervised knowledge transfer for deep learning from private training 
data’. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05755. 
17  Mironov, Ilya (2017) ‘Rényi Differential Privacy’, in 2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security 
Foundations Symposium (CSF), IEEE, pp. 263–275. 
18  Dwork, Cynthia, Talwar, Kunal, Thakurta, Abhradeep and Zhang, Li (2014) ‘Analyze gauss: 
Optimal Bounds for Privacy-preserving Principal Component Analysis’. Stoc, pp. 11–20. 
19  Hardt, Moritz and Price, Eric (2014) ‘The Noisy Power Method : A Meta Algorithm with 
Applications’, in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pp. 2861–2869. 
20  Chaudhuri, Kamalika, Sarwate, Anand D and Sinha, Kaushik (2013) ‘A near-optimal 
algorithm for differentially-private principal components’. The Journal of Machine 
Learning Research, 14(1), pp. 2905–2943. 
21  Chaudhuri, Kamalika, Monteleoni, Claire and Sarwate, Anand D. (2011) ‘Differentially 
Private Empirical Risk Minimization’. The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12, pp. 
1069–1109. 
22  Erlingsson, Úlfar, Pihur, Vasyl and Korolova, Aleksandra (2014) ‘RAPPOR: Randomized 
Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response’, in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM 
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS ’14, New York, New 
York, USA, ACM Press, pp. 1054–1067. 
23  Cyphers, Bennett and Veeramachaneni, Kalyan (n.d.) ‘AnonML: Locally private machine 
learning over a network of peers’. 
24  Liu, Kun, Kargupta, Hillol and Ryan, Jessica (2006) ‘Random projection-based 
© 2018 IEEE 
 
18 
 
multiplicative data perturbation for privacy preserving distributed data mining’. IEEE 
Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 18(1), pp. 92–106. 
25  Jiang, Xiaoqian, Ji, Zhanglong, Wang, Shuang, Mohammed, Noman, et al. (2013) 
‘Differential-private data publishing through component analysis’. Transactions on data 
privacy, 6(1), p. 19. 
26  Kung, S.Y. (2017) ‘Compressive Privacy: From Information\/Estimation Theory to 
Machine Learning [Lecture Notes]’. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 34(1), pp. 94–112. 
27  Mortier, Richard, Haddadi, Hamed, Henderson, Tristan, McAuley, Derek and Crowcroft, 
Jon (2015) ‘Human-Data Interaction: The Human Face of the Data-Driven Society’. 
28  Cao, Yinzhi and Yang, Junfeng (2015) ‘Towards making systems forget with machine 
unlearning’. Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2015–July, pp. 463–
480. 
 
 
Mohammad Al-Rubaie is pursuing the Ph.D. degree in computer engineering at Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa. He is currently a predoctoral Intern at the University of South Florida. His 
research interests include: cyber security, privacy-enhancing technologies and machine learning. 
Contact him at mti@iastate.edu.   
 
J. Morris Chang is a professor at the Electrical Engineering department in the University of South 
Florida. His research interests include: cyber security, wireless networks, and energy efficient 
computer systems. Chang received his Ph.D. degree from North Carolina State University. 
Contact him at chang5@usf.edu. 
 
